

**AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF  
A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT**

I, Alexander F. White, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, being first duly sworn, does hereby depose and state as follows:

**INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND**

1. I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and have been so employed since June 13, 2004. I am currently assigned to the Bangor Resident Agency of Boston Division. In this role, I am assigned as the Airport Liaison Agent for the Bangor International Airport in Bangor, Maine. My training and experience includes investigation into interstate threats on social media and telephone systems. In the investigation into these threats, I have executed search warrants on social media accounts, email accounts, cellular telephones, and computers. I have received training in the preservation and analysis of digital evidence. I have reviewed digital material for evidence of threats and other crimes.

2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon my personal observations, my training and experience, and information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and warrant and does not purport to set forth all my knowledge of or investigation into this matter.

3. Based on my training and experience and the facts set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1038 (False information and hoaxes) has been committed by ROBERT WICKS ("WICKS").

4. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant because it is “a court of competent jurisdiction” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A), & (c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Court is “a district court of the United States . . . that has jurisdiction over the offenses being investigated.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i).

**SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE**

5. On February 13, 2025, text messages were received from telephone number 720-782-3176 by two employees at American Airlines (AA) at Bangor International Airport (BGR). The messages indicated that the sender knew personal details of the AA employees, had infected their phones with viruses, and the sender had “guns and shit” ready with plans to “definitely do a bomb” at the airport. The sender indicated that the incident would happen by “tomorrow morning at 10:50 AM,” February 14, 2025.

6. Security personnel at the airport immediately initiated an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in response to the threat, enlisting the help of the FBI, Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS), Bangor Police Department, and Army National Guard, among other entities. Exigent requests were sent to multiple telecommunications carriers in an attempt to identify the source of the threats, who continued to message employees and law enforcement personnel indicating they were inside the airport and observing the law enforcement reaction.

7. The threats were given considerable credence because they were directed at non-public numbers and referenced individuals who were working at the airport as well as the ongoing activity at the airport. These variables gave the responding emergency personnel the belief that the threat was an “Insider.” An “Insider” is an

individual who knows the people and activities of a potential target (in this case an airport) and has security access and credentials to gain access.

8. The next morning, February 14, 2025, an individual called into the BGR airport line from phone number 669-400-2327 indicating that they wanted to talk to the bomb squad. The caller said "I have a timer on these bombs... I'm panicking really bad right now." When an FBI agent got on the phone with the caller, the caller initiated a countdown of when the bombs were allegedly going to go off.

9. Response to the threats initiated a significant law enforcement response over a period of two days in Maine, Tennessee, Virginia, and Alabama. Allegiant Airlines and American Airlines flights were impacted on routes in Maine, Florida, and Washington, DC, causing at least one passenger to miss a connecting flight and causing delay-related expenses for the airline. Additionally, the readiness of the Maine Army National Guard was impacted as a result of the bomb threats.

#### **STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE**

10. Based on my review of reports and recordings, my conversations with other law enforcement officers, and my own participation in this investigation, I know the following facts.

11. On February 13, 2025, an AA employee received the following messages from 720-782-3176 on his personal telephone:

a. "So you like those bots that's a virus being sent to your phone 😊

have fun with that next person I'm attending to attack is Mary lol. Good luck buddy in that office I got my plans for you all in that airport... guns and shit ready."

b. "Imma definitely do a bomb (bomb emoji) threat this will be something to worry about you ready for some fun gay boy you ready to see what

happens being in the office today you won't even notice what's gonna happen to that airport. Tomorrow morning at 10:50AM you're gonna see what happens dead inside that airport buddy."

c. "I see everything and everyone in that building I know everyone's names faces I'm going after tomorrow morning. I see v in the office I see the security cameras. I see everything I got here and who I'm going after."

d. "I think you' better get someone ready for 10:50Am buddy dogs or someone cuz imma kill everyone in there."

e. The sender included pasted information that appeared to come from a website identifying the owner of the receiving phone.

12. On February 13, 2025, a second AA employee received the following messages from 720-782-3176 on his personal phone:

a. "These bots are gonna keep spamming ya hope you like them... virus in ya phone lol."

b. "I'll do the whole airport next... in 10 minutes we will see who will be laughing."

c. The sender included pasted information that appeared to come from a website identifying the owner of the receiving phone.

13. American Airlines reported the threat to law enforcement agencies at Bangor International Airport.

14. Later in the day, 720-782-3176 sent additional messages to the second AA employee beginning at 4:15 pm:

a. "Let your supervisors go home or else I'll see you on the other side. Oh by the way and the agents."

b. "I love how I see the officers doing. Nun. I'm just standing here looking at him lol. I'm even talking to one of the officers. This is cool asf."

c. "Everyone else is standing around by the counter now. This is a nice view to kill these people."

15. As a result of the threat, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center issued a security incident alert noting "temporary impact to ATC operations reported. AAY1022 was held for 15 min." Based on my training and experience, I recognize that this message indicates that the threat impacted BGR's Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations and that flight AAY1022 was delayed.

16. AAY1022 corresponds to Allegiant Airlines flight 1022. On February 13, 2025, this was a flight from St. Pete-Clearwater (FL) International Airport (PIE) to BGR. Review of flight data for AAY1022 indicates that the flight departed the gate at PIE at 2:11 pm, approximately 10 minutes behind its scheduled departure time of 2:01 pm. AAY1022 landed in BGR at approximately 5:20 pm, approximately 36 minutes behind its estimated landing time of 4:44 pm.

17. At approximately 5:00 pm, an FBI negotiator attempted a phone call to 720-782-3176, which was not answered. The user of 720-782-3176 did respond to text messages, and stated the following:

a. "You're not smart for a human I'm standing around looking at you all this is a nice day. There's nothing here I'm going back to my laptop and ready to blow people up."

b. "Hacking is fun and shit when you know how and what the fuck to do about it. And bombs idc what yall say or nun. You standing there I see you lol 😊 You look pretty vulnerable in your outfit. Anyways kiddo see you on death notes."

18. Several law enforcement agencies responded to the BGR Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to investigate the threat and determined the following:

a. Telephone number 720-782-3176 was a voice over internet protocol (VOIP) number attributed to the TextMe application.

b. TextMe is an internet application that allows a user to communicate from a personal cellular telephone using a different telephone number. An emergency disclosure report was submitted to the parent company of TextMe, Onvoy Spectrum (Onvoy).

c. Onvoy identified the TextMe user identification number for telephone number 720-782-3176 as 292453533, username dhehefd1016, email address dhehefd@gmwil.com (sic) ("SUBJECT ACCOUNT"). Onvoy noted that the account was registered using an iPhone 16 Plus, device ID B18472E3-CE47-40AB-A815-451BB5FCE3E3. It was registered at IP address 2600:6c5d:4e00:4a27:202b:5e0:4c4a:7c3c on January 11, 2025 at 3:45 am and, at the time of the communications with airport employees, the SUBJECT ACCOUNT was using IP 607:fb90:e9da:49b9:d70:ec6:74e0:5f01. That IP was attributed to Charter Communications.

d. The EDR provided the connection detail records for SUBJECT ACCOUNT and revealed 23 messages to the two AA employees between 11:21 a.m. and 11:47 a.m. EST.

e. Emergency requests served to Charter Communication resolved IP address 2600:6c5d:4e00:4a27:202b:5e0:4c4a:7c3c to subscriber Glyndon Wicks in Louisburg, Tennessee, telephone number 931-371-2603, at the date and time the TextMe account was created.

f. Telephone number 720-782-3176 was detected at T-Mobile IP 607:fb90:e9da:49b9:d70:ec6:74e0:5f01 on February 13, 2025 at 20:12:02 UTC when the threats were being texted in.

g. Requests served to T-mobile resolved IP 607:fb90:e9da:49b9:d70:ec6:74e0:5f01 to Glyndon Wicks, telephone number 931-421-1916, IMEI 359410896551106, an iPhone 16 Plus, at the date and time of the threats.

h. IPV6 location data for 931-421-1916 was located connecting to cellular towers in Decatur, Alabama.

19. American Airlines (AA) flight AA5024, a regularly scheduled flight from BGR to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), was delayed due to the threats received by AA employees at BGR. The flight arrived at DCA approximately five hours late, resulting in an impact to a subsequent flight and a cumulative excess arrival delay of 240 minutes. The estimated cost of the delay to American Airlines was \$12,189.

20. Readiness at the Maine Army National Guard's Aviation Support Facility (ASF) was affected as a result of the threats to BGR airport.

a. The ASF is located in Bangor and shares runway and taxi space with BGR. The ASF houses all Army National Guard aviation assets in the state, to include a search and rescue crew with required 24/7 readiness protocols.

b. Like other Maine state facilities on that date, the ASF was closed due to a snowstorm with minimal staffing. When the ASF received notification of a bomb threat to BGR, personnel were sent throughout the base to send anyone present home due to the threats.

c. Contractors were actively working to repair an engine on a National Guard King Air aircraft at the time of the incident. They were sent home and did not complete the project on that day as a result of the threats.

d. The Army National Guard maintains a ready crew for state search and rescue calls at the ASF; it is the only aircraft in the state with dual hoists. Crews are typically at home and respond to the base in cases of emergency. Because the ASF's main gate was closed due to the bomb threat, access to the base was restricted and response times by the search and rescue crew would have been severely impacted should an emergency call-out been initiated.

e. The lost cost for the aircraft contractor mechanics was \$1,850 in contractor costs and \$18,174 in lost service hours.

21. The following day, at approximately 5 am on the morning of February 14, 2025, an individual called in to the BGR switchboard from telephone number 669-400-2327. The caller demanded to speak to the law enforcement officer conducting investigation into the incident, stating:

a. "I will surrender... I want to talk to the actual bomb person... You want to see something happen from up in the sky launched into the airport? Or do you want to see this not continue. Because I want to get this situation fixed here and I want to talk to that man personally."

b. "There are timers on these bombs with time limits. I'm shaking already, I'm really agitating right now, I don't want to press this button. I'm already shaking. I'm panicking really bad right now."

c. "[the bomb] is outside of the building... I have a button right here on my phone right now... I'm giving you five minutes. Hurry up."

d. "It's 8:47. You have until... 8:54. If those phones are not handed back to those agents and those phones are not on, those bombs are going to go boom."

e. "The supervisor phones are hacked, there's three.... Tom is literally, Andrea (I know she's not there... you need to go contact her),... Mitch is involved in this, too."

22. The BGR switchboard eventually connected the caller to an FBI negotiation team who engaged the caller in conversation.

a. The caller stated that his name was Nate Kindly.

b. At approximately 12:45, the caller stated that he placed the calls "as a prank" for Discord.

c. Shortly after that, while on the phone with BGR airport and FBI negotiators, the caller appeared to place a call to the switchboard at Dulles International Airport (IAD), asked to speak to the AA reservations line, and then stated "there's a bomb that's going to go off in 15 minutes at Dulles."

23. An AA employee, Aleah Doyle, was observed in the BGR airport participating in a video chat. Doyle appeared to be filming the law enforcement response to the incidents at the airport. At approximately 8:00 am, investigators approached Doyle, who was in a FaceTime conversation with a contact named "Trey Live." Investigators took custody of Doyle's telephone and ended the call by placing the telephone in "airplane mode."

24. The FBI conducted an interview of Doyle, who provided the following information:

a. Doyle was in a long-distance dating relationship with a man named "Trey Live," who utilized phone number 931-421-1916, who she had met via TikTok.

Live reportedly had lived in Tennessee but recently moved along with his mother to a new location.

- b. Live used an iPhone 16.
- c. Doyle had to work late on February 13 as a result of the bomb threats and had complained to Live.
- d. On at least one occasion, Live called the ticketing desk at AA in BGR trying to talk with Doyle when she had hung up on him.
- e. Live had previously “hacked” into Doyle’s bank account and stole money from her.

25. An FBI employee in Maine telephonically contacted Glyndon Wicks (“Glyndon”), the registered owner of telephone number 931-421-1916, at approximately 1:00 pm EST on February 14, 2025. Glyndon provided the following information:

- a. Glyndon recently moved from Tennessee to Decatur, Alabama with her son, WICKS.
- b. Glyndon and WICKS spoke on speaker phone. WICKS stated he was involved in the threats but alleged that an online friend, “Ethan,” had decided to prank call BGR.

26. Agents from the FBI Huntsville Resident Agency conducted an interview of WICKS at his residence at approximately 4:30 CST on February 14, 2025. WICKS provided the following information:

- a. WICKS’ phone number is 931-421-1916.
- b. WICKS had moved to Decatur from Lewisburg, Tennessee within the previous month.

c. WICKS' iPhone 16, iPhone 8, and Playstation had been hacked and compromised by "Ethan," who WICKS had befriended while playing Grand Theft Auto

5. "Ethan" directed WICKS to make bomb threat calls to BGR airport.

d. "Ethan" was from the United Kingdom but used a VPN to make it appear that he was located alongside WICKS.

27. Agents from the FBI Huntsville Resident Agency conducted a second interview of WICKS at his residence the evening of February 14, 2025. WICKS provided the following information:

a. WICKS admitted to lying about "Ethan," and stated that WICKS himself had placed the bomb threat calls himself to BGR airport on the morning of February 14, 2025. WICKS used the name "Nate Kindly" while making the threats.

b. WICKS admitted to attempting to call a Washington, DC airport to make a threat.

c. WICKS purposefully created new Gmail accounts to download and use the applications TextMe and Voizy AI to avoid being detected when making bomb threat calls and when sending messages.

d. WICKS used an iPhone 8 to make the threats as well as an iPhone 16.

e. WICKS initially denied knowing anyone named Aleah Doyle, but later admitted to having an online relationship with Doyle while using the name "Trey Live."

f. WICKS had used Doyle's credit card without authorization to purchase Fortnite in-game items and a video game, totaling approximately \$400.

g. After initially stating he had never made any threats prior to February 14<sup>th</sup>, WICKS admitted to making the bomb threats against employees at BGR on February 13, 2025. WICKS had gotten the contact information for Doyle's coworkers during a screen sharing session.

h. Upon realizing that Glyndon had received a phone call from the FBI, WICKS deleted and re-installed TextMe and Voizy AI from his iPhone 16 and iPhone 8.

i. WICKS provided consent to search his iPhone 16 and iPhone 8.

28. The iPhone 8 and iPhone 16 were downloaded and provided to your affiant for review with the following results:

a. The iPhone 8 used cellular telephone number 931-271-2514. The call records revealed this phone called the BGR general switchboard number 43 times between 8:00 a.m. EST and 1:30 p.m. EST using the Textme application.

b. The iPhone 16 was "factory reset:" at approximately 3:09 p.m. CST on February 14, 2025. A factory reset deletes all the data on the telephone. The number associated with this telephone was 921-421-1916. The iPhone 16 had an IMEI 359410896551106.

29. Flight records for February 14, 2025 show that AA5024, a regularly scheduled flight between BGR and DCA, was cancelled in both directions. The other outbound AA flight from BGR to DCA, AA5330, was also cancelled on February 14, 2025.

30. On April 15, 2025, your affiant obtained a Federal Search Warrant for the Textme account associated with 720-782-3176 on the date and time of the incident. The content of the messages had been deleted. The call detail records indicated the

following: 107 messages were sent to the two AA employees on February 13, 2025. Furthermore, two inbound telephone calls and 12 text messages from the FBI employee were also detailed during the day of February 13, 2025.

### **CONCLUSION**

Based on the forgoing, there is probable cause to believe that a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1038 (False information and hoaxes) has been committed by WICKS.

Respectfully submitted,

  
Alexander F. White  
Special Agent  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn to telephonically and signed electronically in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Date: May 15 2025

City and state: Bangor, ME



John C Nivison U.S. Magistrate Judge